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Dorothea Schäfer, Boriss Siliverstovs and Eva Terberger
Competition is claimed to be beneficial in development projects promoting micro and small 
enterprise finance although there are still doubts as to whether these loans can be developed into a 
profitable business. Our research sheds new light on the question of how many MSE banking units 
should optimally be created and supported in a certain region. We employ a unique data set from 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for Kazakhstan, and investigate which 
strategy contributes more to the overall success of the program: a strategy of setting up several 
competing banks or a strategy of establishing regional monopolies. 
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“Competition is the most important principle on which our strategy is 
based. As in any other market, effective competition provides incentives 
for banks to offer market based and demand-oriented financial services. 
Competition encourages the development of better products and services at 
lower cost.” (Matthäus-Maier/von Pischke 2004, 1)
1 Introduction
Development politics considers creating financial institutions that offer loans to micro and small 
entrepreneurs (MSE) to be one of the most powerful tools to fight poverty and promote growth 
(Morduch, 1999; Robinson, 2001). For over a decade, public and private donor agencies have 
generously provided subsidies to overcome MSEs’ lack of access to finance by founding and 
promoting microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing and transition countries. In some urban 
regions where donors have become active, the microfinance market almost seems crowded now. 
Not only do financial institutions targeted at MSEs compete with informal money-lenders, but 
different MFIs offer their service to the same client group (Rhyne and Christen, 1999; Chaudhury 
and Matin, 2002).
Whether increased competition among financial intermediaries should always be welcomed, 
however, is far from clear. Politicians, bank practitioners and members of the scientific 
community claim that competition in banking may have negative impacts on both the solvency of 
individual banks and – as a consequence - the stability of the banking system as a whole (Allen et 
al., 2001). If rising competition in financial markets is a subject of controversial discussion in 
developed countries, the potential virtues and vices of competition in the microfinance markets of 
developing countries should be even more open to dispute. After all, subsidies were involved to 
create these markets because existing banks had been unwilling to supply MSE loans on their own 
Page 2 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
3
account. Is competition indicating that donors’ efforts have been successful, and the market has 
taken over or – on the contrary – is competition undermining the viability of MSE loan suppliers?
Our paper aims to shed new light on the as yet unsolved question of whether competition is good 
or bad in microfinance markets. We analyze empirically how the degree of competition affects the 
achievements of development projects promoting MSE loan finance. These projects usually 
provide subsidies to MFIs for capacity and institution building with a dual objective: The financial 
institution should be enabled to extend its loan supply for MSE (outreach to the target group) 
while at the same time aiming at cost coverage and profitability (financial sustainability). The 
latter provides the guarantee that the new business will survive in the market once the donors’ 
support is phased out. 
To our knowledge, no empirical study to date has directly tackled the problem of how competition 
influences the outreach and the financial situation of MFIs. Due to our unique set of micro data on 
the credit portfolio as well as on cost and revenues of competing micro loan departments in 
Kazakhstan, we are able to do this. The data was collected by the Kazakhstan Small Business 
Programme (KSBP), a microfinance program supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) (Terberger and Lepp, 2004). In contrast to microfinance programs 
which directly focus on poverty reduction by offering financial services to the very poor, often in
the form of group loans, KSBP is designed as a program to develop the Kazakh banking market. 
Financial institutions in Kazakhstan were supported by KSBP to build up the know-how and the 
infrastructure to hand out individual loans to micro and small entrepreneurs who had no access to 
formal sector finance before. The set-up of KSBP and, accordingly, the nature of the data, seem 
very well suited to our research question as the program offers its service to several competing 
financial institutions at the same time.
Supporting more than one financial institution is typical of any microfinance program following 
the downscaling approach as it is known. In distinction to donors’ support for a non-profit 
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organization to become a professional MFI (up-scaling), development aid is used in downscaling 
to give incentives for commercial banks to move down the market and open up a loan window for 
MSEs. Typically, in a downscaling project, several partner banks are selected who show serious 
interest in setting up MSE loan departments. These partner banks receive subsidies to cover the 
start-up cost of their new business line.1 When a new MSE loan unit goes into business, its 
revenues go towards covering its regular costs with the ultimate aim that revenues will exceed 
costs, the banks will make profits and continue with their new business on their own behalf when 
the donor withdraws. Accordingly, being a partner bank in such a program means competing with 
other banks for the same clients if more than one partner bank decide to enter the same local 
market. For this feature of the program design, downscaling projects serve as a kind of ‘controlled 
field experiment’ extremely suitable for studying the effects of competition on the dual objective 
of the microfinance approach.
Therefore, our results provide new insights into the problem of optimal policy design, in particular 
regarding the question as to whether competition between MSE lenders is favorable for the 
development of the MSE loan market. By and large, we find that more competition is an 
impediment to the profitability of MSE departments, but it does not necessarily endanger loan 
portfolio quality and financial sustainability. The results concerning outreach are ambiguous. We 
find that the volume disbursed by each banking unit grows with the number of competitors. Also, 
competition increases the number of loans. However, average loan size goes up with competition, 
indicating that competition may force banking units towards serving wealthier clients.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of the related 
literature. In Section 3 we provide details about the history of the KSBP and develop our research 
questions. The data set and the testing methods applied are provided in Section 4. Section 5 
1 The subsidies are normally provided in the form of technical assistance for selecting and training special micro loan 
officers and establishing the administrative structures and procedures of the new loan departments.
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5
contains the presentation and discussion of results. Section 6 concludes and points to open 
questions for further research.
2 Review of Related Literature
Over the past 15 years, numerous papers have pointed out that – due to the special characteristics
of the business - competition in banking might show quite different effects to the efficiency 
enhancing price and volume effects predicted by standard neoclassical equilibrium theory 
(Cetorelli, 2001). The papers that analyze competition in the context of relationship lending are 
closely related to our research question. This lending technique is considered to be the most 
appropriate for lending to young firms and MSEs, even more so in less developed financial 
markets with little public information on potential clients and low legal enforcement of creditor 
rights (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Just as theory would predict, the relationship lending technique 
is regularly applied in microfinance projects, including the KSBP.
However, relationship banking requires some monopolistic power on the part of the lender (Rajan, 
1992). Monopolistic power secures lenders’ rents on costly information acquisition, it makes it 
possible to smooth prices between periods and between borrowers of different qualities, and it 
helps to maintain up the disciplining device of lenders’ threat to cut defaulting borrowers off from 
further credit. Lenders’ monopolies are contested when competition arises. Information spillover 
becomes more likely (Chan et al., 1986; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Borrowers’ switching costs 
may drop and thereby destroy repayment incentives (Ghosh and Ray, 2001). Price smoothing will 
become more difficult or even impossible. All in all, competition may undermine relationship 
lending (Boot, 2000). Accordingly, credit availability to small firms might decrease with rising 
competition - a hypothesis that was backed by empirical analyzes based on data for the US 
banking market (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) and subsequently for other countries (Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Dell’ Ariccia, 2004). On the other hand, increased competition might enhance the value 
Page 5 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6
of a client relationship, inducing banks to invest more in private information acquisition (Boot and 
Thakor, 2000; Yafeh and Yosha 2001). Consequently, competition may actually strengthen 
relationship lending – an argument that also has some empirical support (Berger et al., 2001; 
Berger, Bonime et al., 2004, Elsas, 2005). The question about the effects of competition on 
relationship banking remains open (Boot, 2000; Berger, Demirgü-Kunt et al., 2004, Castañeda
2005).
Besides relationship lending, promotion of MSE finance has the special characteristic of 
subsidization. Research on competition in this context is rare, not least because competition is a 
relatively new phenomenon in the microfinance market.2 The few existing theoretical papers 
suggest that the potentially destructive effects of competition on relationship lending might be 
even more prominent if subsidies are involved. Inspired by development projects attempting to 
extend the supply of micro loans in informal markets by offering cheap formal refinancing sources 
to money-lenders (interlinkage approach), Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) argue along these lines. They 
show that economists’ intuition which “suggests that a fall in the costs of funds to any group in a 
money market should lower the cost of credit to all through general equilibrium effects” (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 1998: 488) might be misleading if subsidies are available. The argument rests on the new 
entry attracted by subsidies. New entry can undermine the endogenous disciplining and 
monitoring technologies a provider of microfinance as a typical relationship lender has to rely on. 
Similar effects arise if new entry prevents the exploitation of economies of scale, or induces micro 
clients to borrow from multiple sources. These adverse effects can be so strong that the intended 
effect of subsidies to provide better access to finance for MSEs may even be reversed. Hoff and 
2 The first paper to point out that competition has reached the microfinance market and will be important for the future 
of the microfinance approach is Rhyne and Christen (1999). The paper was presented in 1998 at a conference on 
Microfinance for practicians and academics by Elizabeth Rhyne, one of the most prominent consultants in the 
microfinance industry. The paper is based on a case study of microfinance in Bolivia, which is one of the furthest 
developed microfinance markets in the world. Donors first supported microfinance in Bolivia  at the end of the 1980s, 
building up several MFIs, among them BancoSol and Caja los Andes which now belong to the flagship institutions of 
the microfinance movement (Rhyne, 2001). Rhyne and Christen point to the dangers that the entrance of commercial 
players into the microfinance market carries for the financial sustainability of incumbent non-profit players.
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7
Stiglitz direct their arguments against the interlinkage approach and even conclude that supporting 
MFIs in the formal sector is the superior microfinance approach. Nevertheless, their arguments 
still hold for MFIs as long as the relationship lending approach is applied and subsidies attract new 
entry. McIntosh and Wydick (2003) argue – much in line with Hoff and Stiglitz - that new entry of 
MFIs may cause multiple source borrowing leading to clients’ overindebtedness and a 
deterioration of loan portfolio quality. Furthermore, competition might prevent MFIs from 
fulfilling their mission of lending to the poor as cross-subsidizing between more wealthy and 
poorer customers becomes more difficult, and finally, subsidies to non-profit lenders might deter 
commercial lenders from entering the MSE market.
Papers have been written, however, that claim that adverse effects of competition in the 
microfinance market can be counteracted. Information sharing between competing lenders (Padilla 
and Pagano, 2000) is mentioned in a Bolivian case study as a device against strategic borrower 
default in microfinance markets (Rhyne and Christen, 1999). Navajas et al. (2003) argue, partly 
inspired by the Bolivian market, that competing MFIs can survive if they concentrate on different 
customer groups and apply different lending technologies.3
Additional insights can be expected from empirical research. However, papers systematically 
analyzing data on competition and microfinance are rare. Vogelgesang (2003) studies the effects 
of competition on repayment behavior using a data set on the loan portfolio of Caja los Andes, a 
prominent Bolivian MFI. She finds that borrowing from multiple sources, customers’ 
indebtedness and loan defaults have increased with competition. At the same time, however, 
repayment discipline of customers with unaffected borrowing behavior has increased – a finding 
that could be explained by the lender’s higher investment in information acquisition. McIntosh et 
al. (2003) study the effects of competition on micro clients’ behavior in Uganda. Similar to the 
Bolivian situation, they find more multi source borrowing and a decline of repayment discipline. 
3
 Navajas et al. (2003) find empirical evidence backing their model results in the data of two big competing MFIs in 
Bolivia, BancoSol and Caja los Andes.
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However, overall they conclude a positive effect of competition. The negative impact on 
repayment behavior did not undermine the financial stability of the financial institutions while 
competition contributed positively to outreach and financial deepening. Chaudhury and Matin 
(2002) find similar results for the “crowded” microfinance market in Bangladesh. Multiple source 
borrowing and overindebtedness are “being managed from turning into a major default problem” 
(Chaudhury and Matin, 2002: 46). 
All these empirical studies rely on a data set provided by one institution. Competitive effects are 
analyzed indirectly by information about the MFI’s clients and – in the case of Uganda –
information about the number of local competitors. Navajas et al. (2003) study a data set supplied 
by two competing MFIs but they concentrate on the question of whether competition induces 
market segmentation. In contrast, by using microdata on various MSE lenders in Kazakhstan, we 
are able to gain insights into how competition influences the outreach and the financial situation of 
MFIs directly.
3 Object and Focus of Research
3.1 KSBP - The EBRD Downscaling Program in Kazakhstan4
Kazakhstan is one of the most advanced CIS states as far as transformation and economic 
development are concerned. The Government firmly committed itself to following a policy of 
liberalization, privatization and structural reform as early as 1993/94. For the past few years, 
positive growth rates, except in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis, an almost balanced 
state budget and a successful fight against inflation have characterized the Kazakh macroeconomic 
situation. In the period of data collection, end of 2003 and beginning of 2004, the economy was on 
a stable growth path as the yearly growth rates attained almost 10 percent. The productivity of 
4
 See also Terberger and Lepp (2004).
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9
labour increased steadily and the unemployment rate was lowered. Moreover Kaszakh banks’ 
lending increased considerably.5
Reforms in the financial sector were very advanced when the KSBP took up its activity in April 
1998. Interest rate ceilings and directed policy lending had long been abandoned, a two-tier 
banking system had been established as early as 1993, and the Government pushed the process of 
privatization with the last commercial bank being privatized in 2001. Moreover, a well 
functioning banking supervisory authority had been established with the National Bank of 
Kazakhstan. A formal loan market for MSEs, however, was almost non-existent.
Accordingly, the KSBP’s principal objectives were “(i) to provide finance to MSEs which 
currently have insufficient access to formal sector finance; (ii) to build up the credit capabilities of 
Kazakhstan's financial sector so that local banks are able to provide MSEs with access to finance 
on a permanent basis” (EBRD 1997). These objectives clearly point out the dual mission of the 
microfinance approach. According to its objectives, the KSBP was not designed as a project to 
directly fight poverty, but as a project of financial market development. However, an indirect 
impact on poverty reduction can be expected through creating sustainable access to formal loan 
finance for MSEs.
The KSBP was provided with a sovereign guaranteed EBRD credit line of 77.6 million USD as a 
refinancing facility for the MSE business of the partner banks. The conditions, however, made 
these funds hardly more attractive than funds partner banks could borrow on the market. Some 
partner banks even had access to cheaper refinancing facilities. The main financial incentive for 
partner banks to participate in the program was the donors’ support of the organizational 
5
 See Indices of main socio-economic indicators, The Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Retrieved 
April 3, 2007, http://www.stat.kz/index.php?lang=eng&uin=1171952844&chapter=1171220044 and 
http://www.expert.ru/tables/kazakhstan/2005/26/document244025/
Page 9 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10
implementation of the new business for which the Kazakh Government, the EBRD and several 
other donor organizations provided a considerable sum6.
Five partner banks which could meet the qualification criteria7 had been selected beforehand, 
among them some of the largest Kazakh commercial banks. Four of these banks were in private 
ownership. The fifth bank was fully privatized in 2001. Two more private banks joined the 
program in November 1998 and September 1999 respectively.
All partner banks were supported by the KSBP to set up new MSE loan departments under 
standardized starting conditions.8 KSBP applied a standardized scheme to select and train MSE 
loan officers; the KSBP standardized the organizational structure of the new loan departments9; 
and the departments were to offer the same standardized products: short term individual loans in 
local and foreign currency to micro entrepreneurs and small businesses. Micro loans range 
between 500 US$ and 5,000 US$, small business loans between 5,000 US$ and 120,000 US$
Six years after the KSBP began, by early 2004, all urban centers in Kazakhstan were covered by 
the program. Partner banks had set up new MSE loan departments in over 120 of their branches 
throughout the country. Their outstanding MSE portfolio grew to over 162 million USD in volume 
and over 35,000 in number, and growth rates were still high. While the average outstanding loan 
amount was about 5,000 US$, the median client received a loan of about 2,000 US$. These 
amounts are rather typical for micro-loan programs in transition countries focusing on financial 
sector development.
In 2003, the KSBP introduced a profit center calculation for the MSE loan departments in each 
partner bank. The first reliable profit center data was released in late 2003. Therefore, there was no 
6
 Among them EBRD, USAID and TACIS.
7
 The qualification criteria consisted of a full banking license, approval by the NBK, IAS audit, program compatible 
strategy and commitment of bank management to gain experience in MSE business, location of geographical interest 
as well as financial stability according to banking regulation standards.
8
 The KSBP was implemented under the management of IPC GmbH, Frankfurt, a private consulting firm specialized 
on development finance.
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opportunity to analyze panel data right from the start of the program. Nevertheless, the data which 
was made available is unique and will allow a cross-sectional analysis of the field experiment on 
competition and microfinance in Kazakhstan. 
3.2 Program Objective and Competition: Hypotheses
Our study aims at empirical insights which could enhance the efficiency of development strategies 
promoting MSE loan finance. Specifically, we are interested in the question of whether (more) 
competition is conducive to the success of a project. Consequently, we develop our hypotheses 
according to the dual objective pursued by such projects in general and the KSBP in particular: 
extending the loan suppliers’ outreach to the target group of MSEs and achieving financial 
sustainability in the form of cost coverage or even profitability.
A major difficulty in measuring success arises from the fact that development programs involve 
subsidies. It is plausible to expect that a project will have better results if the subsidy input is 
increased – even if the paper by Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) warns us that the opposite could be true. 
Consequently, success should be measured per unit of subsidies. This is impossible, however, for 
most projects because detailed information assigning subsidies to program activities and 
objectives is usually missing or not available to the public. The same applies to our data on the 
KSBP. We do not have data on the exact amount and timing of subsidies, and, even if we did, it 
would be impossible to assign them to each single loan department separately because most of the 
KSBP’s service for partner banks is of a central and standardized nature. However, it is precisely 
this feature that could help to alleviate the problem. Because all MSE departments were founded 
under the directions of KSBP it seems plausible to assume that all MSE loan departments that are 
of the same size and the same age have received roughly the same support. Therefore, if we can 
9
 The standardization includes the introduction of an IT-based Management Information System (MIS), the MSE 
lending guidelines and the introduction of an incentive based payment scheme for loan officers, which covered all 
aspects of their performance from disbursement to portfolio quality.
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control for age and size, we should be able to capture significant effects of the competitive 
situation on the achievements of loan suppliers, even if subsidies are involved.
A second difficulty might arise from the dual objective of the program itself if outreach and 
financial sustainability are not complementary aims but involve a trade-off. In the extreme, an 
MSE loan department could attempt to maximize outreach to the smallest customers, even if each 
new loan would produce further losses. In our context, this problem seems of secondary 
importance, however. The business policy of each MSE loan unit can plausibly be assumed to be 
very similar because all of them were set up according to the strategy of the KSBP and all are 
owned by a private commercial bank. In distinction to non-profit MFIs, for-profit banks are 
unlikely to give priority to outreach if that will affect profits negatively in the long run.
Marginal positive profits are a necessary precondition for the financial sustainability of the MSE 
loan business. Without reaching the brink of profitability, commercial loan suppliers can or will 
not be prepared to continue with the business unless they are provided with further subsidies. 
Therefore, profits are the most important indicator of financial sustainability. The majority of the 
theoretical literature predicts a negative effect of more competition on profits. The reasons for this 
vary, however, and they also have different welfare implications. A decline of profits might be due 
to the price effect of competition predicted by neoclassical equilibrium analysis, implying a rise in 
welfare. The opposite might be true if declining profits are caused by competition undermining 
relationship banking. As some authors claim that competition may even strengthen relationship 
banking, rising profits cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, in our first set of empirical tests 
aimed at capturing the objective of financial sustainability, we ask whether the degree of 
competition negatively affects the profitability of MSE loan departments and – by employing 
different cost and revenue indicators – what the likely reasons for this are.
Outreach to the target group has several dimensions in itself. Outreach could be measured in loan 
volume, it could be measured in client numbers, or it could also be interpreted in the sense of 
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reaching the target group of low-income clientele. Although the literature argues that competition 
might lead to a fall in the overall supply of MSE loans, this hypothesis would make little sense in 
our context where first entries into a new market are promoted. The number of banking units 
offering MSE loans should have a positive impact on total outreach purely by size effects. It is 
much less obvious, however, how competition affects the outreach of a single MSE department. 
More competition might show a positive effect caused by the standard price-volume effect or by 
clustering and marketing effects. On the other hand, more competition might have an adverse 
effect on branches’ turnover because competition makes relationship lending more difficult and 
requires more investment in each client relationship. Therefore, in our second set of tests we 
analyze – again by employing different indicators in an attempt to capture the dimensions of 
outreach mentioned above – whether the outreach of a single MSE banking unit increases or 
decreases with the degree of competition.
4 Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Data Set and Variables
The data for our analysis comes from several sources. Most importantly, we have cost and revenue 
information on the MSE loan departments of five out of seven banks participating in the KSBP. 
The information comprises a cross-sectional survey of the loan departments for the first quarter of 
2004. In addition to cost/revenue figures, the survey contains information on the opening and, if 
applicable, the closing date for every reporting department, the name of the bank that established 
it, and the city/town10 where the branch of the bank that introduced the MSE department is 
located. By the end of 2003, the seven participating banks had established MSE departments in 
126 branches. The MSE-business is small compared to the other activities of the participating 
banks. The MSE-loan portfolio as percentage of total assets of reporting banks ranges from 1.03 
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% to 3.13 % by the end of 2003. For all banks, their total loan portfolio makes up about two thirds 
of total assets. For the biggest Kazakh Bank taking part in the program, the MSE-portfolio adds 
the smallest weight to its loan portfolio which can easily be explained by this bank being the 
house bank of many big companies. For the smaller Kazakh banks the new MSE business line is 
more important in volume, and some of them explicitly state that they want to grow especially in 
this field. As the MSE departments operate as separate profit centers within each branch, we will 
refer to the MSE departments just as MSE branches or branches in the following sections. Figure 
1 shows the number of MSE branches per bank. The cost/revenue information in our data set 
covers all branches except those 12 branches that belong to the two non-reporting banks (bank 
types 6 and 7).
In addition to branches, the participating banks set up non-autonomous MSE banking units, 
known as outlets. Outlets are attached to parent MSE branches to which they report their results. 
Data on outlets comes from a second data set that includes opening and – should the situation arise 
- closing dates of all banking units (branches and outlets) for each participating bank sorted by 
region. Besides the name of the region, the data set names the location each banking unit is 
operating in as well as the number of citizens as a proxy for the size of the market. Figure 2 
illustrates the distribution of the 126 branches across the regions. The names of the 16 regions are 
taken from the central KSBP statistics.
[Figure 1: here]
[Figure 2: here] 
10
 In the following sections, we use city and town interchangeably.
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4.2 Independent Variables
In this section we specify our independent variables. The most important explanatory variables 
that would allow us to test the hypotheses of interest are those that measure the degree of 
competition. Typically, the Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI), based on the branch’s share in the 
aggregate credit portfolio of MSE-branches in the city, would be employed for such purpose. 
However, as we miss the data on two participating banks, the data on the total credit portfolios of 
all MSE branches is not available for all towns. Apart from the lack of data, the HHI could have 
the disadvantage of being highly subject to the endogeneity problem. This problem arises as the 
direction of causality between competition and performance of banks or competition and outreach 
is not instantly clear.  Profitability may in particular determine the market share of the bank 
branches in a city. 
Given the data problems with HHI, we introduce the number of competitors (NumberC) to proxy 
the degree of competition. This indicator enables us to take into account the complete magnitude 
of competition as each distinct bank operating an MSE department in a certain location is taken as 
one competitor.  Moreover, due to the large set up costs of market entry, entry and exit is affected 
primarily by predetermined factors, e.g. institutional environment or the strategic goals of partner 
banks and of EBRD (Berger, Demirgü-Kunt et al., 2004). Therefore the endogeneity problem 
should be significantly mitigated. However, we use regressions on the Hirschman-Herfindahl-
Index (HHIend) for a robustness check. The HHIend-indicator is calculated on the basis of the 
available credit portfolios’ values of each branch by the end of the first quarter of 2004.  
The number of competitors (NumberC) ranges from one to seven (number of partner banks). If 
one bank owns more than one MSE branch or outlet in a city, all branches and outlets belonging to 
the same bank are counted as one competitor. In very few cities, some banks are running outlets 
only. Nevertheless, the bank is present as a competitor and therefore is counted as such. Parent 
MSE branch and reporting outlets may be located in different towns. This could cause distortions 
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of cost/revenue figures of parent branches, for instance, if the figures for the parent branch contain 
the results of an outlet that is a monopolist in its location while the parent branch faces three 
competitors. To account for such distortions, we would have had to remove parent branches from 
our data set if parent branch and corresponding outlet face different competitive pressure. 
Fortunately, however, the sample contains only outlets that face the same competitive 
environment as their parent branch. Thus, we have kept the information on all parent branches in 
the sample. The competitive environment of KSBP MSE branches is shown in Figure 3. The MSE 
branch is a monopolist in seven cities. The full range of all possible competitors is present in two 
cities. Most frequently, two or three distinct banks operate in the same city. 
[Figure 3: here]
In the second set of regressions we use the HHIend.  Note that this indicator comprises the 
aggregate credit portfolio of all MSE-branches in only 62 cities/towns. However, those cities in 
which data on credit portfolios is lacking are the most important locations in terms of high 
competition. Due to this fact and the observation of often fairly young branches of banks 6 and 7, 
it may be justified to assume that the missing shares of banks 6 and 7 are not large enough to be 
decisive for the results. 
The degree of competition may also depend on the proximity of clients to the nearest banking unit 
(Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and on market size. As we lack information on the local distribution 
of banking units, we have attempted to control for these issues by employing a density measure. 
The density of MSE banking units (LDensity) is defined as the logarithmic transformation of the 
number of inhabitants of the town divided by the sum of branches and outlets in that location.
To control for effects other than that of multiple entries into the local microlending market, we 
employ several control variables. Following the literature, profitability of the MSE branches is 
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modeled in terms of cost variables, risk variables and competition variables (see e.g. Barajas, 
Steiner and Salazar, 1999 and Shaffer, 1993). Total administrative costs per unit of the average 
outstanding portfolio of the MSE departments (CostAdmin) reflects the cost side in terms of a 
ratio.11 As refinancing costs are not under the control of the MSE departments but are determined 
by other business of the mother bank, we do not analyze these costs separately.  Risk enters the 
model through the arrears rate (Arrears) defined as the ratio of the observed arrears to the average 
outstanding portfolio. 
In addition, we expect the age of each banking unit to influence its performance due to economies 
of scale (Altunbas and Molyneux 1996). The portfolio volume of most branches grows over time 
while certain fixed costs remain constant. Furthermore, experience leads to greater 
professionalism of the loan officers and thus could have a positive impact on results – to name just
a few reasons for the likely impact of the Age variable. When a bank branch becomes older, the 
marginal effect of the time it has been in operation is likely to change. Therefore, we have 
included the age squared variable (AgeSqr) that picks up differentiated marginal effects of the 
Age variable on the relevant dependent variables. The age distribution in the complete sample is 
shown in Figure 4. 
To control for the different structures of administrative costs, the size of each branch defined by 
the number of loan officers (Size) is included in the empirical regressions. Figure 5 shows the size 
distribution of the sample.12 Class 1 contains all branches with one or zero loan officers. Class 9 
includes all branches that employ more than 8 loan officers. The remaining classes correspond to 
the respective number of loan officers given on the horizontal axis. 
Finally, the  bank type dummy variables (Type1, Type2, …, Type7) are included in the empirical 
regressions in order to capture the specific influences of the mother bank, such as business style, 
11
 We also tested the covariate expenses for personnel (CostPersonnel) which is less comprehensive than 
(CostAdmin) . Results did not change qualitatively. Thus we abstain from reporting these regressions.
12
 The figure does not include the 12 non-reporting branches.  
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popularity of the brand name, corporate governance or refinancing situation. Similarly, in order to 
capture economic differences between the 16 regions, we employ a set of the region dummies 
(Region1, Region2, …, Region16) as we do not have access to region-specific socio-economic 
information for 2003 and 2004.
[Figure 4: here]
[Figure 5: here]
4.3 Impact of Competition – Dependent Variables and Testing Methods
The initial cost/revenue file contains data on 126 banking units that were set up before 2004. 
However, the financial data is missing for all branches of bank types 6 and 7 (12 branches). This 
leaves us with 114 observations. Since the very young MSE branches (defined as those that are 
from 1 to 3 months old) need a start-up period in order to build up a loan portfolio, we have also 
expelled these branches from the estimation sample, which leaves us with 111 branches. 
Furthermore, we have excluded from the analysis two branches that report zero loan officers. As a
result, we are left with 109 observations.
As explained above, in order to analyze the influence of competition on the financial sustainability 
of the MSE business, we will use the profitability of the MSE branches as the main indicator. The 
profitability is represented by two indicators, the interest income per unit of the average 
outstanding MSE portfolio (InterestIncome), the rate of return on the average MSE loan 
portfolio, named return on assets (RoA), since the loan portfolio is the only asset which can be 
exclusively assigned to the micro loan department. Arrears are a direct indicator of portfolio 
quality and can therefore be seen as an indirect indicator of profitability. Thus we also run a 
regression with arrears as dependent variable.
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For measuring outreach we focus on turnover-related indicators such as the volume and the 
number of loans disbursed per MSE unit during the first quarter of 2004 (VolumeDisb, 
NumberDisb). We chose these flow related measures instead of measures representing the stock
of the accumulated portfolio because the competitive situation changed while the stock of loans 
was being built up. Therefore, measures of the new business in the first quarter of 2004 can be 
expected to give the best reflection of the actual competitive situation. Furthermore, we employ 
the average loan size disbursed (ALoanSize) as a measure of outreach. As bigger firms are likely 
to receive higher loans, the latter is likely to reflect the degree to which a branch is dedicated to 
the target group of micro and small clients. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the selected 
indicators.
[Table 1: Summary Statistics 
here]
All of the regressions except the one for arrears have been estimated using the robust estimation 
method in order to downplay the role of outliers in our dataset. All the computations were 
produced in STATA using the command RREG which in contrast to the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method iteratively re-weights observations such that the better behaved observations get 
larger weights attached. 
For estimating the impact of competition on the arrears we could not apply the OLS method as 
most of the banks in our sample (82 out of 109) report no arrears at all. In order to account for the 
presence of the zero values in the dependent variable we estimated the parameters of the model 
using the Tobit regression. For the sake of comparison, we also report the results of the Probit 
regression which assesses the impact of competition on the likelihood that a particular bank has 
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arrears. For the dependent variable in the Probit regression we use the constructed indicator 
variable that takes the value of one when a bank has arrears and the value of zero otherwise.
5 Presentation and Discussion of Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimation results on the link between competition and measures of 
profitability and outreach. The first regression indicates that the number of competitors decreases 
the gross interest rate (InterestIncome) that an MSE branch earns on the average portfolio. The 
coefficient of NumberC is negative and highly significant while none of the control variables 
show a significant effect. As shown in Table 4, one standard deviation of NumberC decreases the  
InterestIncome by -0.312 standard deviations. We obtain basically the same insights by using 
HHI for the complete sample (Table 3). One standard deviation of HHIend increases the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable by 0.248. 
 [Table 2: Results
 here]
[Table 3: Results
 here]
When the return on the average outstanding portfolio RoA is regressed on NumberC, the number 
of competing banks has a negative impact on RoA with significance at the 1% level. The HHI 
shows the corresponding positive sign. The coefficient of Ldensity is positive and significant. 
This finding may reflect that clustering and/or spillover effects play a role for profitability. We 
have also tested smaller models and an alternative cost variable. It turned out that the significance 
Page 20 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
21
level is stable across different specifications. The comprehensive cost variable CostAdmin affects 
the RoA negatively and significant, which is in line with expectations.
In sum, our hypothesis that competition has a negative effect on profits is confirmed by the data. 
The magnitude of the impact of the competition, expressed in standard deviations, is given in 
Table 4.  As most of the theoretical literature suggests, profitability, measured in rates of return on 
scarce financial and human resources, is linked negatively to local competition for microlending 
branches in Kazakhstan. The finding is consistent with an empirical result developed in Chang et. 
al. (1997) for the banking market of New York City. They conclude that profits decrease if banks 
follow other banks’ branches. As mentioned above, declining rates of return do not endanger 
financial sustainability per se, however. The donor community might even welcome such a 
development if profits are still high enough to keep the business attractive – a discussion that is 
resumed later.
[Table 4: Results
 here]
What we can already conclude, however, is that the negative effect of competition on return 
measures cannot be attributed to a decline in repayment discipline (see Table 5).13 Although most 
theoretical literature predicts that competition will undermine disciplining devices of relationship 
lending, we do not find any evidence that the quality of the portfolio is affected. Tobit and Probit 
models yield almost the same results. In both cases the specifications fail to reveal a significant 
impact of NumberC (HHIend) on the arrears. This result is in contrast to Chaudhury and Matin 
(2001), McIntosh et. al (2003), and Vogelgesang (2003) but is consistent with Park et. al. (2002) 
where it is argued that competition induces financial institutions to exert greater screening and 
enforcement effort.
[Table 5: Results
13
 IKhide (2003) showed that a higher perceived risk on the bank’s side can cause a credit crunch in developing 
countries. 
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 here]
When interpreting our results, it needs to be kept in mind that all of the MSE departments are still 
under the influence of the central consulting service provided by the KSBP. The standardized 
screening and monitoring technique implemented by the KSBP is a very restrictive one that 
implies risking rejecting a loan application from a client that might perform well rather than 
risking a default. Therefore, the rates of arrears and the loan write-offs have always remained 
extremely low in almost all of the MSE departments, no matter how fast their loan portfolios were 
growing (Terberger and Lepp, 2004). 
Turning to our results on outreach, the regression results are again quite clear. The variable 
VolumeDisb measures the gross increase in the size of the portfolio of an MSE unit in Quarter 1 
of 2004. The competition coefficients are highly significant with a positive sign in the case of 
NumberC and a negative one with HHIend. One standard deviation change in the number of 
competitors (in the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index) increases (decreases) the volume disbursed by 
0.28 (-0.25) standard deviations (see Table 4 for the economic impact on the outreach variables). 
This implies that the disbursement of loans increases in volume if local competition intensifies. As 
expected, the Size of the branch measured in the number of loan officers is highly significant, and 
also Age is highly significant, the sign of the coefficient also being positive. Presumably, older 
branches are capable of disbursing higher loan volumes because they have more experienced loan 
officers and more established customers who apply for bigger loans subsequent to repaying their 
first one. We also find a significant positive impact of increased competition on the number of 
loans disbursed (NumberDisb).  However, local competition affects the average size of disbursed 
loans (ALoanSize) significantly, an effect that holds again with respect to both indicators of 
competition. Thus, if competition increases in the local market, the MSE branches provide clients 
with bigger loans on average. Interestingly the indicator for the density of MSE banking units in 
Page 22 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
23
the city (Ldensity), has also a positive influence on NumberDisb which may reflect improved 
reachability for clients. The effect on ALoanSize is negative, but significance depends on the 
specification.
In sum, our analysis of outreach and competition shows mixed results. Competition goes hand in 
hand with an increase of the branches’ activity in terms of the volume of loans granted. This could 
be attributable to the standard price/volume effect of competition and clustering effects in MSE 
lending which is an innovative business for banks in Kazakhstan. Branches might learn from their 
competitors and be motivated by their presence. Furthermore, the pure fact that several banks in 
the same location advertize MSE loans may give a boost to potential clients’ knowledge and trust, 
increasing the pool of sound loan applications. These would be exactly the outreach effects donors 
hope for when they make the promotion of competition an integral part of their strategy. 
The volume effect of competition is obviously not accompanied by a comparable rise in numbers 
of loans as we find an increase in the average size of loans. This result would probably not be 
appreciated by donors who place high priority on lending to micro firms and a low-income group. 
Thus, the impact of competition on outreach is ambiguous. On the one hand, competition 
increases turnover-related indicators but, on the other hand, bigger single loan amounts suggest 
that competition shifts the business model towards bigger clients. Due to economies of scale, 
bigger loans are cheaper for the branch. Our results might indicate that branches respond to 
increased competitive pressure with bigger loans as an attempt to compensate for decreasing 
margins.
When evaluating this trade-off that shows up in the different outreach dimensions, the objectives 
of the KSBP should be borne in mind. Explicitly, the KSBP was designed as a program of 
financial market development and not as a program to directly fight poverty. Therefore, a trend to 
move up the market probably induced by competition should not outweigh the positive impact of 
competition on the supply of MSE loans in terms of volume, as long as these loans serve clients 
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who have viable investments and had no access to finance previously. On the contrary, granting 
larger, more profitable loans might keep up the feasibility to cross-subsidize the service for 
smaller clients. Whether the partner banks of the KSBP will be willing to do this, once donors 
have withdrawn, is a question beyond the scope of this paper.
However, without its financial sustainability, MSE lending will not be supplied in the Kazakh 
financial market on a permanent basis. For a private commercial bank as a for-profit player, 
financial sustainability is achieved if the scarce resources the bank is devoting to the MSE loan 
business earn the same (risk adjusted) rate of return that these resources could generate in any 
alternative business opportunity. Our results on profitability indicate that the rates of return are 
influenced negatively by competition. The question arises whether the rates are still sufficiently 
high to keep the business attractive, despite competition.
A study on the Kazakh banking sector by the IMF and Worldbank (2004) reports declining 
interest rates on loans as well as declining margins due to increased competition. Compared to the 
MSE business, however, the interest rate income on loans reported in this study is considerably 
lower than the average interest rate income on the MSE portfolio of KSBP banks. For 2003 the 
study reports an interest rate received on loans of 13.05% on average, and of 12.47% for the three 
largest banks. According to our data set, the MSE portfolio generates an interest income on 
average portfolio volume of almost 5.5% in the first quarter of 2004 (see Table 1). Accordingly, 
the interest rate received per annum should be well over 20%. On the one hand, the relatively high 
gross interest income of the MSE portfolio could be influenced positively by the excellent 
portfolio quality. This conjecture is supported by the high rate of loan loss provisions of Kazakh 
banks. According to the report, provisions amount to 4.88% of deposits on average and 5.37% for 
the three largest banks in 2003. On the other hand, MSE loan rates are usually higher than the 
rates of loans to medium and large enterprises to cover the higher administrative costs per unit. 
However, these additional costs are more than covered by the additional interest rate income, as 
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the return on the MSE portfolio indicates. The mean return on the average outstanding portfolios 
amounts to over 2.7% in the first quarter of 2004 (see Table 1). This exceeds the return on total 
assets of Kazakh banks for the whole year of 2003, which is reported as 1.98% on average and as 
1.84% for the three largest banks. We have to take into consideration, however, that the total 
balance sheet of a bank does also contain unproductive assets, while the only asset assigned to our 
MSE departments is the productive loan portfolio. Furthermore, no overheads, for example, some 
of head office costs, are assigned to the MSE departments when their return is calculated. 
Nevertheless, the MSE business on average seems to have not only passed the line of full financial 
sustainability, but is contributing to the banks’ profits.14 In the case of Kazakhstan, it seems 
justified to conclude: On average, competition shows a negative effect on profitability without 
endangering the financial sustainability of the MSE business.
However, the downscaling approach is applied in other countries where the preconditions for 
establishing a financially sustainable MSE business might be less favorable than in Kazakhstan. In 
such contexts, competition might actually have adverse effects on programs promoting MSE 
finance. Furthermore, even in Kazakhstan, competition might have slowed down the process of 
reaching the brink of cost coverage, causing more subsidies to be spent than would have been 
necessary to develop the MSE loan market with less partner banks.
6 Conclusions
Based on a unique data set comprising cost and revenue figures of competing MSE banking units 
in Kazakhstan, we analyze the influence of competition on the success of an EBRD development 
project promoting MSE loan finance in the Kazakh commercial banking market. The main 
objectives of any program promoting MSE finance are twofold: MSE lending should be 
established as a viable business whose survival in the market is not dependent on further subsidies 
14
 It has to be mentioned, however, that there are rather big differences between the various MSE departments. The 
least profitable department contained in Table 1 reports a return on average portfolio of just 0.15% for the first quarter 
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(financial sustainability) and the outreach to the target group of micro and small enterprise should 
be maximized. 
As the relationship lending technology is applied in MSE lending and its efficiency can be 
adversely affected by competition, we are surprised to find that competition, measured by the 
number of competing banks in a location, and lending activity are positively correlated in 
Kazakhstan without undermining repayment discipline. The outreach, measured by the volume of 
new loans disbursed, increases with competition while arrears are not affected. The volume 
increase is accompanied by an increase in the number of loans. However, the average single loan 
amount increases with competition, hinting at banks moving up the market. Furthermore, our 
results show a negative link between the degree of competition and the profitability of MSE 
business, measured as the rate of return on the loan portfolio. Although for Kazakhstan it is not 
likely that competition has been a serious impediment to the financial sustainability of MSE 
business, it cannot be ruled out that competition in MSE lending may endanger the survival of 
new business in a market under less favorable conditions. Future research dedicated to cross-
country studies on the effect of competition in developing banking markets promises to give 
further insights. Even in Kazakhstan it is not unlikely that the MSE loan market could have been 
developed with less subsidies if MSE loans had been offered by fewer competitors. For this 
conclusion to be less speculative, however, further research based on detailed data on 
achievements of programs and subsidies is needed.
of 2004. An analysis of why profitability varies is beyond the scope of this study.
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Figure 1: Number of MSE Branches per Bank
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Figure 3: Competitive Environment
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Figure 4: Age of Branches per Bank
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Observat-
ions       Mean                  Std.Devn.            Skewness             
Excess 
Kurtosis     Min Max           
Normality test:   
Chi^2(2) =   
Interest 
Income* 109 5,446 0,847 0,583 4,829 2,125 9,403
49.760 
[0.0000]**
CostAdmin* 109 0,857 0,525 1,770 4,501 0,000 3,368 57.347 [0.0000]**
RoA* 109 2,705 1,107 -0,564 2,859 -1,617 6,692 23.049 [0.0000]**
Arrears* 109 0,088 0,325 6,364 46,879 0,000 2,841 1606.2 [0.0000]**
VolumeDisb 109 499020 495670 2,789 9,502 28987 3026400 217.40 [0.0000]**
NumberDisb 109 91,68 60,59 1,70 3,01 18,00 329,00 86.047 [0.0000]**
ALoanSize 109 5334,500 3141,600 1,385 1,828 1407,500 16427 55.312 [0.0000]**
NumberC 109 4,339 1,783 -0,198 -1,119 1,000 7,000 11.541 [0.0031]**
HHIend 109 0,381 0,215 1,571 1,658 0,208 1,000 118.01 [0.0000]**
* The variables are expressed as a ratio of the average outstanding portfolio, multiplied by 100.
Table 1: Normality tests and descriptive statistics 
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Model InterestIncome  RoA VolumeDisb NumberDisb ALoanSize
Age -0.0075 0.0005 0.0331*** 0.0118 0.0160*
(0.0139) (0.0173) (0.0078) (0.0091) (0.0084)
Agesqr -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002* -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ldensity 0.0972 0.3730** 0.1558* 0.3576*** -0.1127
(0.1519) (0.1817) (0.0917) (0.1126) (0.1085)
Size 0.0104 0.0290 0.1844*** 0.1835*** -0.0170
(0.0357) (0.0419) (0.0184) (0.0223) (0.0221)
Arrears 0.1592 -0.0873 0.2272** 0.0223 0.1565
(0.1802) (0.2214) (0.0989) (0.1168) (0.1082)
CostAdmin 0.0331 -1.0547*** -0.3751*** -0.3257*** -0.1749*
(0.1540) (0.1998) (0.0832) (0.0976) (0.0903)
NumberC -0.1482*** -0.1742*** 0.1365*** 0.0602** 0.1217***
(0.0410) (0.0512) (0.0223) (0.0246) (0.0244)
R 2 .33 .48 .87 .66 .65
N 109 109 109 109 109
Notes: Every regression includes an intercept, bank type and region dummy 
variables (not shown).
***, **, * - indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% percents.
Profitability Indicators  Outreach Indicators
Table 2: Results for Number of Competitors (NumC) (Robust)
Model InterestIncome RoA VolumeDisb  NumberDisb ALoanSize
Age  -0.0065  -0.0164 0.0258***  0.0126 0.0156*
(0.0139) (0.0162)  (0.0080) (0.0089) (0.0085)
Agesqr  -0.0000  0.0001 -0.0003***  -0.0002** -0.0001
(0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ldensity  0.1488 0.3553** 0.1114 0.3445*** -0.2559**
(0.1479) (0.1727) (0.0926) (0.1109) (0.1074)
Size  0.0077  0.0366 0.1963*** 0.1826*** -0.0122
(0.0351)  (0.0409)  (0.0191) (0.0221) (0.0227)
Arrears 0.1455  -0.1742  0.2306** 0.0116 0.2188*
(0.1808) (0.2120) (0.1051)  (0.1145) (0.1113)
CostAdmin 0.0729  -1.1284*** -0.4779***  -0.3201***  -0.1868**
(0.1507)  (0.1843)  (0.0861)  (0.0954) (0.0916)
HHIend 0.9745*** 1.1480***  -0.9967*** -0.5426***  -0.8574***
(0.3018) (0.3551)  (0.1749)  (0.1985) (0.1901)
R 2 0.30  .50  .86 .68 .62
N 109 109 109 109 109
Notes: Every regression includes an intercept, bank type and region dummy 
variables (not shown).
***, **, * - indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% percents.
Table 3: Results for the Herfindahl Index (HHIend) (Robust)
Profitability Indicators Outreach Indicators
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Row InterestIncome RoA VolumeDisb NumberDisb ALoanSize
1 NumberC Coef. -0,148 -0,174 0,137 0,060 0,122
2 NumberC St.dev. 1,783 1,783 1,783 1,783 1,783
3 Product (row 2*row 3) -0,264 -0,311 0,243 0,107 0,217
4
Dependent 
Variable. St.dev. 0,847 1,107 0,869 0,622 0,557
5 Ratio (row 3/row 4) -0,312 -0,281 0,280 0,173 0,389
Row InterestIncome RoA VolumeDisb NumberDisb ALoanSize
1 HHIend Coef. 0,975 1,148 -0,997 -0,543 -0,857
2 HHIend St.dev. 0,215 0,215 0,215 0,215 0,215
3 Product (row 2*row 3) 0,210 0,247 -0,215 -0,117 -0,185
4
Dependent 
Variable. St.dev. 0,847 1,107 0,869 0,622 0,557
5 Ratio (row 3/row 4) 0,248 0,223 -0,247 -0,188 -0,331
Notes: Economic impact is measured as the ratio of the values reported in the row `Product' to the 
standard deviation of the respective dependent variable.
Dependent variable
Dependent variable
Table 4: Economic impact of NumC and HHIend (expressed in Standard Deviations)
Model NumC HHIend NumC HHIend
Age 0.0720** 0.0733** 0.0710* 0.0722*
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0396) (0.0398)
Agesqr -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010* -0.0010*
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Ldensity -0.8047* -0.8369* -0,800 -0.8384*
(0.4613) (0.4679) (0.4929) (0.5035)
Size 0.2300*** 0.2184*** 0.2884*** 0.2753***
(0.0836) (0.0820) (0.1000) (0.0977)
CostAdmin -0.2102 -0.2410 -0.2114 -0.2570
(0.4375) (0.4355) (0.4798) (0.4830)
NumberC 0.0076 -0.0034
(0.0950) (0.1046)
HHIend -0.4630 -0.4506
(0.7772) (0.8600)
R 2 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.30
N 109 109 109 109
Notes: Every regression includes an intercept, bank type and 
region dummy variables (not shown).
***, **, * - indicate the significance level of 1%, 5%, 
and 10% percents.
Table 5: Arrears
ProbitTobit
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